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INTRODUCTION
“No means no.” “It’s on us.” “Me too.”
At first glance, these phrases seem trivial and inconsequential.
Couple them with the power of social media and a simple “hashtag,”
however, and they quickly become prevalent means of unifying people
against a common cause: sexual assault. The rise in sexual assault
awareness campaigns has made a traditionally-taboo subject come to
the fore of national discourse. 1 It is doubtlessly true that society is now
better off having recognized the need to make the public more keenly
aware of the problems associated with sexual assault and harassment.
Appallingly, it has reached the point where these problems are

 J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Bachelor of Arts, Michigan State University. I would like to thank
Professor Hal R. Morris for his support, encouragement, advice, and instruction
throughout the completion of this comment. I would also like to thank Eva Dickey
and the rest of the Seventh Circuit Review editorial staff for their advice and edits as
I moved toward the final version of this comment.
1 See, e.g., Megan Thomas, Get the inside scoop on Sexual Assault Awareness
Month 2019, National Sexual Violence Resource Center (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://www.nsvrc.org/blogs/get-inside-scoop-sexual-assault-awareness-month2019.
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commonly referred to as “rape culture.”2
Rape culture becomes worse still on college campuses. For
decades, rape culture had become engrained in the college experience,
but ignored by school authorities. Because institutions of higher
education failed to provide adequate responses to students’ horrific
experiences with collegiate rape culture, and have perhaps aggravated
the effects of those experiences, politicians took the reins in finding a
solution. As the Seventh Circuit recently recognized, the solution
authorized—and essentially required—by the federal government has
backfired and created a whole new set of problems for individuals
accused of sexual misconduct.
Colleges and universities have responded aggressively to
sexual misconduct accusations since the U.S. Department of Education
imposed harsh requirements upon them in 2011. But they have done so
at great expense to another significant, yet unpopular, group of
students—those accused of sexual misconduct. Colleges and
universities have unreasonably harmed the accused and obstructed the
truth-seeking purpose of sexual misconduct investigations by, for
example, refusing to permit hearings, prohibiting their lawyers’
involvement in adjudicatory proceedings, and requiring the accused to
prove his or her innocence. They have also failed to apply consistent
standards of proof, thus causing inconsistent and arbitrary results,
among other things.
Yet, colleges and universities fear that if they ease these
procedures to favor the truth-seeking process, they will lose federal
financial aid. College students accused of sexual misconduct have
therefore been mistreated by their beloved schools even before they
are duly found responsible for the alleged misconduct. The common
result in these proceedings is that the accused are often deprived of
their education, and perhaps their future endeavors, without the
process to which they are constitutionally and statutorily due.
This Comment highlights the accused’s perspective of schools’
2

See Rape Culture, Marshall University Women’s Center,
https://www.marshall.edu/wcenter/sexual-assault/rape-culture/ (last visited Dec. 2,
2019) (explaining how “rape culture” means that society has “disregard[ed]
women’s rights and safety,” among other things).
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responses to sexual misconduct allegations. It argues, perhaps
controversially, that courts have a duty to protect the interests of those
students accused of sexual misconduct, and that the Seventh Circuit
has rightly joined other courts in recognizing and enforcing this duty.
To be clear, this Comment does not seek to undermine or otherwise
criticize students’ allegations of sexual misconduct. Rather, this
Comment seeks to illuminate an underappreciated perspective through
the lens of the Seventh Circuit’s 2019 decision in Doe v. Purdue
University, et al.3
Part I of this Note explores the historical foundation about
schools’ responses to sexual misconduct allegations via Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act of 1972. Part I discusses Title IX’s
evolution over the last several decades as well as its present
implications. Part II introduces the Seventh Circuit’s response to a
faulty implementation of Title IX procedures and surveys how the
Seventh Circuit’s position compares with other courts’ early
interpretations. Part III finally advocates that, while the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Purdue University rightly concludes that
Purdue University deprived the male student-plaintiff of his rights, it
did not go far enough. Specifically, Part III will discuss how the
Seventh Circuit’s decision, together with those from other circuit
courts of appeals, highlights the federal government’s role in
systematically depriving male students of constitutional rights and,
ironically enough, the guarantees afforded by Title IX.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972
1.

History Leading Up to Title IX

The story behind higher education’s response to rape culture
begins decades ago. Interestingly, that story does not even begin with
sexual assault or harassment per se, but rather with gender
3

928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019).
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discrimination in education4 and extra-curricular athletics.5
Before Congress enacted Title IX, gender discrimination in
education and extra-curricular athletics existed beyond doubt.6 The
problem to be addressed by Title IX was not necessarily express
rejection of women’s rights, although that issue certainly also existed
within the education system. The problem was instead a lack of parity
with women’s educational, professional, and athletic opportunities,
even where such opportunities existed in some basic form.7
Perhaps clearer still were the discriminatory practices targeting
women’s athletics. 8 Whereas universities provided team doctors,
insurance, and more than ample funding to men’s athletics programs,
women’s athletics programs did not receive team doctors or insurance
and received little, if any, funding.9 This stemmed at least in part from
the underlying attitudes toward women’s athletics compared to men’s
athletics.10 As the Association of American Colleges reported,
athletics have “perpetuate[d] sex stereotypes and myths about what is
4

See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of California State Universities, 198 F.3d 763, 766
(9th Cir. 1999); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 934
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)).
5
See 143 Cong. Rec. H4,218 (daily ed. June 23, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Mink) (noting that Title IX served to increase girls’ and women’s involvement in
athletics); Note, Emily S. Bley, Left in the Rain Without an Umbrella: How Doe v.
Brown University Leaves Nonstudents Unsheltered by Federal Title IX Protections,
64 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 1, 1, 8 (2019).
6 Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 504 F. Supp. 2d 88, 94 (W.D. Va.
2007) (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)); see Olivia B.
Waxman, She Exposed the Discrimination in College Sports Before Title IX. Now
She’s a Women’s History Month Honoree, TIME (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://time.com/5175812/title-ix-sports-womens-history/.
7 See 143 Cong. Rec. H4,218 (daily ed. June 23, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Mink).
8 See Waxman, supra note 6.
9
Id.
10 See Ass’n of Am. Colleges Report on the Project on the Status and
Education of Women at 2,
https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc3500/sc3520/015800/015858/pdf/
sports_report.pdf.
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‘right’ for men and what is ‘right’ for women.”11 The attitude is that
“[m]en are ‘supposed to be’ strong and aggressive, both physically and
emotionally, while women are ‘supposed to be’ weak and passive.” 12
The traditional view was that “the traits associated with athletic
excellence—achievement, self-confidence, aggressiveness, leadership,
strength, swiftness—[were] often seen as being in ‘contradiction’ with
the role of women.”13 These attitudes fueled “the total athletic
opportunities that [were] available to women,” such as funding,
adequacy of athletic facilities, and “employment conditions of their
teachers and coaches.”14
Yet laws governing public institutions of higher education
before Title IX seemed to have only perpetuated this ongoing
discrimination by “deliberately exclud[ing women] from earlier
antidiscrimination legislation on the grounds that educational
institutions were autonomous entities that ought not to be subjected to
government interference.”15
Federal public officials thus contemplated a more precise
resolution focusing on gender discrimination in higher education.
2.

Enactment of Title IX

Though many already saw the need for congressional action,
public support for legislation curbing gender discrimination in higher
education really began in the midst of the Civil Rights Era.16 In 1965,
in what was apparently a direct response to the Civil Rights
11

Id.
Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 See Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, The History, Uses, and Abuses of Title
IX, 2016 BULLETIN OF THE AM. ASS’N OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 69, 70 (citing
Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, tit. VIII, § 804(a)-(b), 79 Stat.
1219, 1270 (1965) (prior to amendments)).
16 See Iram Valentin, Title IX: A Brief History, Women’s Educational Equity
Act (WEE) Digest (Aug. 1997),
http://www2.edc.org/womensequity/pdffiles/t9digest.pdf.
12
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Movement, President Johnson publicly declared “the policy of the
Government of the United States to provide equal opportunity in
Federal employment for all qualified persons” and “to prohibit
discrimination in employment because of race, creed color, or national
origin,” among other things.17 Even outside of direct federal
employment, Executive Order 11246 prohibited all entities that
contract with the federal government from discriminating in
employment based on “race, creed, color, or national origin.”18
Wholly absent from President Johnson’s directive, however,
was the prohibition on sex discrimination.19 Recognizing this error,
President Johnson amended the Order “to include discrimination based
on sex.”20 From there, women’s rights activists took advantage of the
directive and challenged employment practices based on sex.21 One
such activist, Martha Griffiths, was a member of the U.S. House of
Representatives.22 Representative Griffiths “gave the first speech in
the U.S. Congress concerning discrimination against women in
education” on March 9, 1970. 23 That speech ignited the passions of
other federal public officials, resulting in “the first [federal
government] contract compliance investigation involving sex
discrimination.”24
Representative Griffiths’ speech caught the attention of the
chair of the House Special Subcommittee on Education,
Representative Edith Green.25 The House Special Subcommittee on
Education (hereinafter the “Subcommittee”) first attempted to prohibit
17

Exec. Order No. 11246, § 101, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965) (prior to
amendment).
18 Id. § 202.
19 See generally id.
20 Valentin, supra note 16, at 2..
21 Id.
22 Id.; Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, supra note 15, at 70.
23 Valentin, supra note 16, at 2.
24 Id.; Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, supra note 15, at 70.
25 See Valentin, supra note 16, at 2; Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, supra note
15, at 70; see also 143 Cong. Rec. H4,218 (identifying the specific subcommittee
chaired by Representative Green).
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sex discrimination “in any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance” by amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
originally prohibited only race, color, and national origin. 26 But since
doing so would have pegged the ban on discrimination based on sex in
more than just education, and thus would have sparked a massive
change in the Civil Rights Act beyond what was initially intended by
Representatives Griffith and Green, they turned their attention to the
Higher Education Act.27
Title X of House Resolution 7248 therefore sought to “prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex in any educational program
receiving Federal funds.”28 The House bill also “authorized the Civil
Rights Commission to investigate sex discrimination,” among other
things.29 After it was reported out of the House Education and Labor
Committee in late September 1971, the full House made some changes
but left the prohibition on sex discrimination intact. 30
Meanwhile, the Senate considered its own amendments to the
Higher Education Act.31 But when the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare reported its Higher Education Act amendments to
the full Senate, it contained no prohibitions on sex discrimination. 32
Instead, Senator Birch Bayh, during the full Senate’s floor debate in
August 1971, proposed an amendment to the Senate bill “to ban sex
discrimination in any public higher education institutions or graduate
program receiving federal funds.”33 The Senate’s first attempt at
prohibiting sex discrimination in education was halted in its tracks,
however, when a majority of the Senators voted it down on the ground
that Senator Bayh’s amendment was irrelevant to the rest of the bill,
26

143 Cong. Rec. H4218 (statement of Rep. Mink) (discussing the history of
Title IX to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of its enactment).
27 Id. The Higher Education Act was codified as 20 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See id. at 4218-19.
31 Id. at 4219.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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which had nothing to do with sex discrimination.34
Senator Bayh persisted. In February 1972, when the Senate
considered the House’s version of the Higher Education
Amendments—which did contain language about the usage of federal
education funds—Senator Bayh once again offered an amendment to
ban sex discrimination at educational institutions receiving federal
funds.35 The Senate’s final version of the Higher Education Act’s
amendments, which contained Senator Bayh’s prohibition (with some
exemptions added to appease some skeptical senators), passed without
objection.36
The final version was styled the Education Act Amendments of
1972 and included in Title IX of the legislation a ban on “sex
discrimination in all Federal education institutions receiving Federal
funds, except for undergraduate admissions policies of private higher
education institutions and public institutions of a traditional single-sex
policy.”37 The full House and Senate each passed the Education
Amendments Act on June 8, 1972. 38 President Nixon signed it into law
just fifteen days later.39
Title IX has, ever since, 40 contained the following
groundbreaking language: “No person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 41
B.

Evolution of Title IX

34

Id.
Id.
36 See id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 None of the subsequent legislative amendments to Title IX, codified at 20
U.S.C. § 1681, impacted this central language.
41 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-65).
35
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The initial passage of Title IX was, as seen infra Section I.A.2,
relatively uncontroversial. But that was before people realized Title
IX’s massive reach. Section 1 below first discusses how the executive
and judicial branches have expanded the reach of Title IX’s language.
Section 2 then introduces the Obama Administration’s guidance
document that expanded Title IX too much.
1.

Expansion of Title IX’s Reach

After Congress enacted Title IX, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare42 took on the task of promulgating regulations
to effect Title IX’s ban on sex discrimination in education. 43 In 1975,
that Department imposed regulations requiring the institutions subject
to Title IX to designate a coordinator to oversee compliance with Title
IX, post publicly the contact information for the Title IX coordinator
as well as all relevant policies, and conduct a one-time evaluation of
their compliance with Title IX. 44 The 1975 regulations also permitted
educational institutions to “take remedial and affirmative steps to
increase the participation of students in programs or activities where
[sex] bias has occurred.”45 These regulations fit well into the overall
scheme of preventing and remedying sex discrimination at educational
institutions. These regulations were primarily “use[d] in the early
years of the statute . . . by female athletes demanding equal
opportunities to participate in school athletic programs.”46
Courts began expanding the reach of Title IX’s language in
42

The executive department in charge of implementing Title IX changed to the
Department of Education upon that Department’s creation in 1979. See generally
Act of Oct. 17, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-88, §§ 201, 301, 93 Stat. 668 (1979). There is
no indication that the Department of Education was created because of Title IX, but
was instead created for other reasons not pertinent here.
43 See Valentin, supra note 16, at 2.
44 Id. at 2-3.
45 Id. at 3.
46 Cecily Fuhr, Causes of Action Under Title IX of Education Amendments Act
of 1972 Against College or University for Sexual Harassment of Student by School
Personnel or Other Student, 78 Causes of Action 2d 381, § 2 (2019).
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1977 with the Connecticut federal district court’s decision in
Alexander v. Yale University.47 The court there faced the foundational
question of whether students had standing to bring a private cause of
action under Title IX.48 It answered that question in the affirmative,
thus permitting one of the plaintiffs (a female student) to proceed with
her Title IX claim.49 At the same time Alexander implied a private
right of action under Title IX, the Seventh Circuit refused to recognize
such an implied right in Cannon v. University of Chicago.50 The
United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve the
disagreement between Alexander and Cannon. In a six to three
decision, the Supreme Court agreed with Alexander that a private right
of action under Title IX existed. 51
The Supreme Court’s decision in Cannon therefore paved the
way for an influx of Title IX lawsuits. 52 In 1998, the Supreme Court
held that sexual harassment by agents of a covered school could be
remedied under Title IX where the school had “actual knowledge” and
acted with “deliberate indifference” to its agent’s sexual harassment. 53
And the Court extended this holding just one year later, holding that
covered schools are liable under Title IX for student-on-student sexual
harassment pursuant to the “actual knowledge” and “deliberate

47

459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977); see Fuhr, supra note 46, § 2 (explaining the
historical developments of Title IX in the courts).
48 459 F. Supp. at 2, 4.
49 Id. at 5-7, aff’d in relevant part, 631 F.2d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 1980).
50 See id. at 4 (citing and disagreeing with Cannon v. University of Chicago,
559 F.2d 1063, 1082 (7th Cir. 1977)).
51 Cannon v. Univ. of Chic., 441 U.S. 677, 709, 717 (1979).
52 A few years after Cannon recognized an implied right of action under Title
IX, “Congress amended Title IX to eliminate the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity in Title IX action,” thus allowing causes of action against public
universities over any objections on sovereign immunity grounds. See Fuhr, supra
note 46, at § 2. And the Court extended the right to seek monetary damages in a Title
IX lawsuit in 1992. Id. (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60
(1992)).
53 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292-93 (1998).
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indifference” standards.54
In response to the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on Title
IX in the 1990s, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights
(OCR) implemented two important guides into how schools can
prevent sexual harassment under Title IX’s dictates.55 The first,
published in 1997, “require[ed] that schools have a grievance process
for reporting sexual harassment and warning that schools that fail to
respond to a hostile environment ‘permit[ ] an atmosphere of sexual
discrimination to permeate the educational program and results in
discrimination prohibited by Title IX.’”56 Four years later, OCR
clarified that its guidance was intended to “‘emphasize that, in
addressing allegations of sexual harassment, the good judgment and
common sense of teachers and school administrators are important
elements of a response that meets the requirements of Title IX.’” 57 In
other words, a driving purpose of the 1997 and 2001 guidance
documents was to grant flexibility to schools to develop the policies
and procedures that they saw fit.
This changed in 2011.
2.

Dear Colleague Letter

Despite the fundamental changes stemming from Title IX’s
enactment in 1972, nothing had more impact on Title IX
enforcement—and eventually on John Doe’s deficient sexual
misconduct proceedings—than a seemingly innocuous letter dated
54

See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644-47 (1999).
See Amy B. Cyphert, The Devil Is in the Details: Exploring Restorative
Justice as an Option for Campus Sexual Assault Responses Under Title IX, 96 DENV.
L. REV. 51, 57 (2018).
56 Id. (quoting Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students By
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,034
(Mar. 13, 1997)).
57
Id. (quoting REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF
STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, at ii-iv (Jan. 2001), available at
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf).
55
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April 4, 2011.58 Unfortunately for everyone—schools, victims, and the
accused—this letter, now coined the “Dear Colleague Letter,” became
anything but innocuous.
In the Letter, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil
Rights explained numerous statistics emphasizing the urgency of its
words.59 It first identified the daunting statistics related to sexual
violence involving students: “that about 1 in 5 women are victims of
completed or attempted sexual assault”; about “6.1 percent of males
were victims of completed or attempted sexual assault”; “college
campuses reported nearly 3,300 forcible sex offenses” in 2009; “800
reported incidents of rape and attempted rape and 3,800 reported
incidents of other sexual batteries at public high schools”; and “the
likelihood that a woman with intellectual disabilities will be sexually
assaulted is estimated to be significantly higher than the general
population.”60
Recognizing these terrifying statistics about sexual harassment
and sexual violence on university or college campuses, the Department
saw the immediate need for “a call to action for the nation.”61 The
Letter therefore served to “ensur[e] that all students feel safe in their
school, so that they have the opportunity to benefit fully from the
school’s programs and activities.”62 In other words, the so-called Dear
Colleague Letter “spell[ed] out for schools exactly how they should
undertake certain duties under Title IX” as a means of remedying, or
at least mitigating, these problems.63
The Dear Colleague Letter’s first task was to expand the
definition of “sexual harassment” under the court precedents discussed
RUSSLYNN ALI, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, POL’Y
GUIDANCE LETTER (Apr. 4, 2011), available at
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.html
[hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter].
59 Id. at 2.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See Cyphert, supra note 55, at 58.
58
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supra Section II.B.2.64 Without any laws or court decisions to support
its ultimate conclusion, the Letter concluded, without explanation, that
“[s]exual harassment of students . . . includes acts of sexual
violence.”65 This is the first sign that the Letter attempted to
improperly develop Title IX.
The Dear Colleague Letter also “discuss[ed] the proactive
efforts schools can take to prevent sexual harassment and violence”
and “provid[ed] examples of remedies that schools and OCR [the
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights] may use to end
such conduct, prevent its recurrence, and address its effects.” 66 The
proactive efforts included implementing more educational programs
related to sexual harassment and violence, increasing the amount and
types of resources for victims, employing formal training programs for
student and faculty employees, making materials explaining the
applicable policies, rules, and resources easily accessible to the
community, and improving efforts to encourage students to report
incidents of sexual harassment and violence, among other things. 67
These proactive efforts are not the target of this Comment’s
condemnation.
Rather, it is the Department’s mandated remedies that have
been cause for concern. The Dear Colleague Letter set forth the
following significant changes, among other things:
(1)

(2)

(3)

[M]andated that schools use a “preponderance
of the evidence standard” when weighing
whether sexual harassment had occurred;
[S]trongly discourage[d] schools from allowing
the parties personally to question or crossexamine each other during the hearing;
[M]andated that universities conclude their
investigations within a “reasonably prompt”

64

See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58, at 1, 1 n.2
Id. at 1.
66 Id. at 2.
67 Id. at 14-15.
65
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time frame, which the OCR suggested is
generally under sixty days; and
[R]equired schools that allowed appeals to
permit either party to appeal. 68

It is also noteworthy that the Dear Colleague Letter “forbade the use of
mediation, even on a voluntary basis where all parties agreed, to
resolve complaints of sexual assault brought under Title IX.” 69
The Dear Colleague Letter clarified that it sought to give only
“significant guidance” to schools on how to approach Title IX-related
inquiries; it apparently did not provide schools with a binding formal
mandate.70 And yet the Letter immediately backtracked on this
seemingly innocuous language. It clarified that, while it did not “add
requirements to applicable law,” it “provide[d] information and
examples to inform recipients about how OCR evaluates whether
covered entities are complying with their legal obligations.” 71 In other
words, while OCR did not purport to establish a rule with binding
legal effect, it did seek to strip schools of federal benefits (funding) if
it did not comply with the Letter’s “guidance,” even if it would not
otherwise be in violation of federal law.72 The Letter has therefore
placed schools between a rock and a hard place; they either (1)
disregard the Letter and risk losing the funding that they desperately
need, or (2) succumb to what the Letter says and impose merciless

68

Cyphert, supra note 55, at 58.
Id. at 58-59.
70 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58, at 1 n.1 (pointing out that the
Letter “does not add requirements to applicable law, but provides information and
examples to inform recipients [schools] about how OCR evaluates whether covered
entities are complying with their legal obligations”); Cyphert, supra note 55, at 5859.
71
Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58, at 1 n.1.
72 See id.; Tamara Rice Lave, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication: Why
Universities Should Reject the Dear Colleague Letter, 64 U. Kan. L. Rev. 915, 94647 (2016) (explaining how institutions interpreted and responded to the Dear
Colleague Letter).
69
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disciplinary procedures for those accused of sexual misconduct. 73
Schools have overwhelmingly chosen the latter, perhaps
because that kind of choice has put schools in a position where they
must choose between the better of two undesirable options. OCR
indeed thought about this ahead of time, for they enforced the terms of
the Dear Colleague Letter at least in large part based on fear, not on
any binding legal force. Professor Lave sums up this fear-based
influence well:
[I]n the [Dear Colleague Letter], OCR told academic
institutions that if they didn’t take certain measures
(like lowering the burden of proof) they would be found
in violation of Title IX. In an unprecedented move,
OCR began publishing a list of universities under
investigation for violating Title IX, which put
tremendous financial and social pressure on schools to
comply with the [Dear Colleague Letter]. Even
universities that may believe the [Dear Colleague
Letter] is procedurally or substantively invalid are
rolling over and complying because the cost of not
doing so is simply too high. In essence, OCR’s actions
have transformed what could have been a legitimate
guidance document (if it had not had language that
gave it the force of law) into something that is legally
binding.74
Schools have therefore imposed the procedures that the Letter requires
notwithstanding the traditional flexibility that they historically had in
imposing their own methods of complying with Title IX.75

73

See Lave, supra note 72, at 947.
Id. (emphasis in original).
75 See id. at 947-48 (explaining that OCR’s previous, unchallenged guidance
from 1997 and 2001 “give universities significant flexibility in deciding how to
address allegations of sexual assault”).
74
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Responses by President Trump’s Department of
Education

On September 7, 2017, President Trump’s Secretary of
Education, Betsy DeVos, indicated publicly that the Trump
Administration intended to repeal and replace the Dear Colleague
Letter.76 The Trump Administration followed through on their
intentions later that month when they “formally rescinded” the Letter
and replaced it with interim guidance pending a new administrative
rule governing how schools can remain in compliance with Title IX. 77
This interim guidance purportedly “removed many of the restrictions
in the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter placed on colleges, including the
requirement that they use a preponderance of the evidence standard . .
. and the suggestion that most investigations should conclude within
sixty days.”78
Secretary DeVos’ words rang loud when she declared that the
“era of rule by letter is over.”79 Though her words are gallant, they are
not necessarily true; the devastating effects of the Dear Colleague
Letter cannot be dispelled so easily. The unstable history of the OCR’s
Title IX enforcement makes it difficult for colleges and universities to
know how they can stay in compliance with Title IX. 80 Because of the
massive risks to colleges and universities, it is not unreasonable to
think that they will be hesitant to change their policies at all in fear
that the federal government will deprive them of the funds on which
they so heavily rely. It is thus clear that, although the Dear Colleague
76

Cyphert, supra note 55, at 61.
Id. at 62.
78 Id.
79
Betsy DeVos, Sec’y of Educ., Remarks at George Mason Univ. (Sept. 7,
2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/secretary-devos-prepared-remarks-titleix-enforcement.
80
See Note, Michelle J. Harnik, University Title IX Compliance: A Work In
Progress In the Wake of Reform, 19 Nev. L.J 647, 687 (2018) (“The OCR’s failure
to provide clear guidelines and its failure to require hearings, appeals, and a uniform
evidentiary standard has left colleges having to decide for themselves how to handle
such complaints and risk improperly carrying out their Title IX obligations.”).
77
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Letter has been rescinded, fear of the OCR survives.
What is more, the Dear Colleague Letter will continue to have
an impact for all students affected by college and university policies
and procedures implemented from April 4, 2011, at least until
September 7, 2017. For at least six and a half years, a letter that
seemed so innocuous on its face rooted itself in schools’ disciplinary
systems and wreaked havoc among students’ education and livelihood.
Such devastation is likely to remain at least until the right compromise
between protecting victims and protecting the accused is reached. 81
II.

THE COURTS STEP IN

With such frightening instability in how schools are supposed
to comply with Title IX, and the devastating consequences of messing
up, simply rescinding the Dear Colleague Letter is only the first step in
the road to recovery. Fortunately, courts are stepping in to begin
remedying many of the problems associated with the Dear Colleague
Letter’s impact on schools’ policies and procedures regarding sexual
misconduct on campus.
Section II.A below introduces the legal framework within
which the courts operate in Title IX litigation. Section II.B then delves
into the Seventh Circuit’s groundbreaking decision in Doe v. Purdue
University that recognized the Dear Colleague Letter’s harmful impact
on male students. Section II.C discusses the Seventh Circuit’s retreat
from precedent in Doe v. Columbia College Chicago, where it refused
to recognize the harms inherent in the Dear Colleague Letter. Finally,
Section II.D discusses how other circuits have addressed the concerns
facing the Seventh Circuit in Purdue University and Columbia College
Chicago.
A.

Title IX’s Legal Framework

As noted earlier, Title IX “provides that ‘[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
81

See id.
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in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.’”82 A student claiming that his or her school violated Title
IX must therefore establish three elements: (1) that the school received
funding from the federal government; (2) that the student “was
excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of an educational
program” at the school; and (3) that the school discriminated against
the student because of his or her sex.83 Where a student has been
disciplined after a sexual misconduct proceeding, the first two
elements are relatively easy to satisfy.84 The third element is generally
the determinative element. 85
Some circuits use an intricate test using several categories of
discrimination to determine whether a school discriminates based on
sex.86 The Second Circuit, for example, analyzes Title IX lawsuits
against schools using “erroneous outcome” and “selective
enforcement” approaches. 87 The “erroneous outcome” category
requires a plaintiff-student to “show that he ‘was innocent and
wrongly found to have committed the offense.’” 88 The “selective
enforcement” category includes proof “that ‘regardless of [his] guilt or
innocence, the severity of the penalty and/or the decision to initiate the
proceeding was affected by the student’s gender.’” 89 The Fifth Circuit

82

Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 667 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting 20
U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-73)).
83
See Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2019).
84 See Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 667 (“It is undisputed that Purdue receives
federal funding and that John was ‘excluded from participation in [or] denied the
benefits of . . . [an] education program’ when Purdue suspended him.” (alterations in
original)).
85 See, e.g., Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d at 854; Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at
667.
86 See Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 667.
87 Id. (citing Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994)).
88 Id. (quoting Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715).
89 Id. (quoting Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715).
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has adopted the Second Circuit’s two-factored approach.90 And the
Eleventh Circuit applies the Second Circuit’s “erroneous outcome”
approach.91
The Sixth Circuit uses not only the Second Circuit’s two
categories, but also added two more categories of its own: the
“deliberate indifference” and “archaic assumptions” tests.92
The Seventh Circuit, however, believed that these specific
approaches “simply describe ways in which a plaintiff might show that
sex was a motivating factor in a university’s decision to discipline a
student.”93 Assuming the first two elements are satisfied, courts in the
Seventh Circuit ask one simple question to determine whether a
student has stated a valid Title IX discrimination claim: Do the facts,
taken as true, “‘raise a plausible inference that the university
discriminated’” against the student because of his or her sex? 94
B.

The Seventh Circuit Speaks: Doe v. Purdue University
1.

Facts95

The plaintiff, fictitiously named John Doe, was a student at
Purdue University enrolled as a member of the Navy Reserve Officers’
Training Corps (ROTC). Other than the disciplinary proceedings
discussed below, John had an “unblemished disciplinary record.” 96
Jane Doe was also a student at Purdue University and was a Navy
90

Id. (citing Plummer v. Univ. of Hous., 860 F.3d 767, 777-78 (5th Cir.

2017)).
91

Id. (quoting Doe v. Valencia Coll., 903 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2018)).
Id. (citing Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2018)).
93 Id.
94 Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d at 855 (quoting Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at
667-68).
95
Unless otherwise noted, facts stated in this subsection are taken from the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 656-58 (7th Cir.
2019).
96 Brief of Appellant at 3, Doe v. Purdue Univ., No. 17-3565 (7th Cir. Apr. 6,
2018).
92
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ROTC member.
Purdue University was, and still is, “a land grant university
established by the State of Indiana with a main campus in West
Lafayette, Indiana and is audited by the State of Indiana, the
beneficiary of state authorized bonds and recipient of state and federal
grants.”97
John and Jane’s story was, at first, a happy one—they were
romantically involved during the fall of 2015. Between October and
December 2015, John and Jane engaged in consensual sexual
intercourse about fifteen to twenty times. There was never any dispute
that, throughout this three-month period of time, all of the instances of
sexual intercourse between John and Jane were consensual.
Over the course of the fall 2015 semester, however, their
relationship eroded. Suffering from depression, Jane talked with John
about her feelings of hopelessness and expressed to him that she hated
her life and wanted to run away. Jane’s behavior became “increasingly
erratic.” Her depression culminated in a suicide attempt which
occurred immediately in front of John on December 13, 2015. Though
they continued dating after Jane’s suicide attempt, John and Jane’s
sexual relationship ended. Neither Jane nor John informed anyone
else, apparently including emergency medical personnel, about Jane’s
suicide attempt.
Whatever remaining romantic relations terminated, however,
when John reported Jane’s suicide attempt to two university resident
assistants and an advisor. Jane thereafter broke off all relations with
John and distanced herself from him. Throughout all of this, Jane
made no reports to Purdue, the police, or any other third party about
any alleged sexual misconduct by John.98 Nor did Jane make any
reports of sexual misconduct by John to anyone through March 2016.
April 2016 was, however, Sexual Assault Awareness Month.
To spread awareness, organizations such as the Center for Advocacy,
Response, and Education (CARE), a center at Purdue “dedicated to
supporting victims of sexual violence,” hosted events across Purdue’s
97
98

Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
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campus that encouraged students to report sexual assaults. CARE
achieved its praiseworthy goal within just the first few days of April:
five students reported sexual misconduct to Purdue.
Jane was one of those five students. Jane reported to Purdue
officials that she woke up to John “groping her over her clothes
without her consent” while she was sleeping in his room. Jane,
according to her initial report, declined John’s sexual advances only to
find out that John “confessed that he had digitally penetrated her while
the two were sleeping in Jane’s room earlier that month.” She also
complained of additional acts of misconduct, such as sifting through
her underwear drawer, chasing her around while joking that he would
taser her, entering her room without permission after they broke up,
and becoming angry in front of her.
Soon after her report, Purdue’s Dean of Students and Title IX
coordinator, Katherine Sermersheim, reached out to John by letter to
inform him that Purdue had initiated a formal investigation into Jane’s
allegations of sexual misconduct. Upon receipt of Sermersheim’s
letter, “John was suspended from the Navy ROTC, banned from all
buildings where Jane had classes, and barred from eating in his usual
dining hall because Jane also used it.” Although Jane had not filed a
formal complaint, Purdue decided to investigate anyway, perhaps
because the Dear Colleague Letter obliged schools to investigate any
instances of sexual harassment or violence regardless of whether they
are asked to do so by complaining witnesses.99
John thereafter denied in writing every one of Jane’s
allegations of misconduct. John admitted, however, that he once
“touched Jane’s knee while she was sleeping on a futon and he was on
the floor next to her” after her suicide attempt. Other than that, John
unequivocally denied all of Jane’s allegations of sexual misconduct,
including her allegation that he groped her and engaged in other
inappropriate sexual and nonsexual behavior.
In addition to outright denying sexual misconduct, John
provided circumstantial evidence of his innocence. He informed
Sermersheim that Jane continued to talk with John over the winter
99

See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58, at 4.
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holidays and invited him to her room on campus when school resumed
that following January. John also produced evidence to Sermersheim
indicating that Jane was emotionally “troubled” and “unstable.” And
when John and his “supporter” (someone who could accompany John
to any meetings) met with investigators, he continued to deny the
allegations, provided evidence that he believed showed his innocence,
including “friendly” text messages between Jane and him, as well as
the names of more than thirty people who could and would “speak to
his integrity.”
Pursuant to Purdue’s Title IX policies, Sermersheim submitted
a completed “investigators’ report” to a three-person panel assembled
by Purdue’s Advisory Committee on Equity. The Committee’s
ultimate purpose was to review Sermersheim’s report, listen to the
parties’ accounts of what happened, and then make a recommendation
to Sermersheim on guilt or innocence and any recommended
sanctions.
John’s hearing with the Committee panel was, however,
lackluster at best. Although John appeared at the hearing to defend
himself, he was neither given a copy of Sermersheim’s report nor
allowed to review it. John became aware of Sermersheim’s findings
only because a Navy ROTC representative gave him a redacted copy
to review for a few minutes. From this cursory review of the factual
findings, John learned that the investigators “falsely claimed that he
had confessed to Jane’s allegations” and “failed to include John’s
description of Jane’s suicide attempt.”
John and his supporter attended the hearing and met with the
Committee members for about thirty minutes. Because Jane did not
appear at the hearing, CARE’s director wrote a letter on behalf of the
allegations against John summarizing the accusations. To John’s
amazement, he had read more of the investigators’ report in his
cursory review than two of the three panelists; those two panelists
“candidly stated that they had not read the investigative report.” And
the third panelist apparently assumed John’s guilt. John was not
allowed to see or address the evidence at the hearing. He was also not
allowed to present any witnesses, “including character witnesses and a
roommate who would state that he was present in the room at the time
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of the alleged assault and that Jane’s rendition of events was false.”
About one week after the hearing, Sermersheim informed John
in “a perfunctory letter” that she found him guilty of sexual violence
and therefore suspended him from Purdue for an academic year.
Because Sermersheim failed to detail any factual basis for her
determination, John briefly won an appeal to Purdue’s Vice President
for Ethics and Compliance, Alysa Rollock. But Sermersheim quickly
responded with the following “detailed” factual findings:
1. [Jane Doe] had fallen asleep on a futon with you on
the floor beside her. She woke up and found that you
inappropriately touched her over her clothing and
without her consent by placing your hand above her
knee, between her legs, and moved it up to her “crotch”
areas; and
2. On another occasion, while she was sleeping and
without her consent, you inappropriately touched [Jane
Doe] by digitally penetrating her vagina.
Sermersheim identified the basis for these factual findings in a
similarly perfunctory fashion: “I find by a preponderance of the
evidence that [John Doe] is not a credible witness. I find by a
preponderance of the evidence that [Jane Doe] is a credible witness.”
This time, however, Rollock upheld Sermersheim’s factual
findings, determination of guilt, and imposed sanction. John was
thereafter forced to resign from the Navy ROTC because of its zerotolerance sexual harassment policy.
2.

Procedural History

John sued various agents of Purdue University, including
Sermersheim, Rollock, and the investigators, for violating the
Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that they deprived him of his liberty
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and property without due process of law. 100 On the Fourteenth
Amendment claims, he separately sought monetary relief and
injunctive relief.101 He also sued Purdue University for violating Title
IX by discriminating against him because he was a male. 102
A federal magistrate judge dismissed all three claims with
prejudice.103 The magistrate judge dismissed John’s § 1983 claim
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment because “the disciplinary
proceedings did not deprive John of either liberty or property, so the
Due Process Clause did not apply.”104 The magistrate dismissed John’s
claim for injunctive relief for lacking standing since there was no
evidence of future harm.105 The magistrate judge also dismissed John’s
Title IX claim because he could not show enough evidence of
discrimination on the basis of sex.106
John appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, where he challenged the dismissal of all three claims for
relief.107
3.

John Doe’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim

John first alleged that “he was punished pursuant to a process
that failed to satisfy the minimum standards of fairness required by the
Due Process Clause.108 He claimed that Purdue’s procedures failed due
process scrutiny in eight ways: (1) “he was not provided with the
investigative report or any of the evidence on which the
decisionmakers relied in determining his guilt and punishment”; (2)
100

See Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 658 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), respectively).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 658-59.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 659.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
101
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“Jane did not appear before the Advisory Committee”; (3) John “had
no opportunity to cross-examine Jane”; (4) “Sermersheim found Jane
credible even though neither Sermersheim nor the Advisory
Committee talked to her in person”; (5) “Jane did not write her own
statement for the panel, much less a sworn one”; (6) “Sermersheim
was in charge of both the investigation and the adjudication of his
case”; (7) “the Advisory Committee was blatantly biased against him”;
and (8) “the Advisory Committee refused to allow him to present any
evidence, including witnesses.”109
The court first noted that Seventh Circuit precedent holds that
“due process claims in the context of university discipline has focused
on whether a student has a protected property interest in his education
at a state university.”110 But precedent also holds that education,
without more, does not constitute a property interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment.111 Rather, courts in the Seventh Circuit “‘ask
whether the student has shown that he has a legally protected
entitlement to his continued education at the university.’”112
The first way John could assert a constitutionally-protected
property interest in his education is by claiming a valid contractual
entitlement.113 The court quickly rejected John’s claim of such a
contractual entitlement because his claim rested on an Indiana state
court holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects students from
expulsion or suspension without due process of law, a generalized
property interest that the Seventh Circuit has squarely rejected. 114
The court nevertheless allowed John to proceed on his
Fourteenth Amendment claim because he stated a constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in pursuing his occupation of choice: naval
109

Id.
Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. (quoting Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. at Chic., 741 F.2d 769,
773 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original)).
113 See id. at 660.
114 Id. (citing Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2008))
(rejecting John Doe’s reliance on Reilly v. Daly, 666 N.E.2d 439, 444 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996)).
110
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service.115 Under Seventh Circuit precedent, John had to satisfy the
“‘stigma plus’ test, which require[d] him to show that the state
inflicted reputational damage accompanied by an alteration in legal
status that deprived him of a right he previously held.”116 This test
requires more than simply having to tell future employers about a
guilty finding from Purdue to maintain a Fourteenth Amendment
claim.117
Writing for the unanimous panel, Judge Barrett concluded that
John satisfied the stigma plus test because Purdue’s guilty finding
came with a legal obligation to disclose it to the Navy.118 Ordinarily,
disclosure of a guilty finding is voluntary and therefore does not by
itself tarnish the reputation so as to violate the Fourth Amendment’s
stigma plus test.119 But John alleged more; he alleged that the state
forced Purdue’s hand—and necessarily harmed John’s future—
because the law required John to allow Purdue to disclose his guilty
finding to the navy.120
John also adequately met the second part of the stigma plus
test: a change in John’s legal status. 121 Once Purdue formally
adjudicated John’s guilt, “he went from a full-time student in good
standing to one suspended for an academic year.” 122 The “official
determination of guilt . . . deprived John of occupational liberty” by
“caus[ing] his expulsion from the Navy ROTC program (with the
accompanying loss of scholarship) and foreclosed the possibility of his

115

See id. at 661-63.
See id. at 661.
117 See id. at 662.
118 Id.
119 See id. at 661-62 (citing Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408-09 (7th
Cir. 1997)) (explaining that “a plaintiff who publicizes negative information about
himself cannot establish that the defendant deprived him of a liberty interest,” and
that it is often “uncertain whether [a plaintiff’s] prospective employers would ever
find out” the reasons for a discharge or expulsion).
120 Id. at 662.
121 Id. at 662-63.
122 Id. at 662 (citing analogous Seventh Circuit cases).
116
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re-enrollment in it.”123 John therefore satisfied the stigma plus test,
thus allowing the court to delve into the adequacy of Purdue’s
procedures that led to the guilty finding. 124
The test for Fourteenth Amendment-compliant procedures is
fundamental fairness, which “is always a context-specific inquiry.”125
Schools have ample authority to implement procedures and
penalties.126 Many factors, such as “the severity of the consequence
and the level of education,” inform the schools’ choice to impose
particular procedures and penalties.127 Notably, the Supreme Court has
held that “[a] 10-day suspension warrants fewer procedural safeguards
than a longer one.”128
Given this framework, John’s Seventh Circuit panel agreed
with John.129 Reasoning that John “was suspended by a university
rather than a high school, for sexual violence rather than academic
failure, and for an academic year rather than a few days,” the court
concluded that “John’s circumstances entitled him to relatively formal
procedures.”130 Yet Purdue did not disclose evidence to John and
withheld relevant evidence in adjudicating his guilt, which is “itself
sufficient to render the process fundamentally unfair.”131 What is
more, the court had even more reason to believe that Purdue’s
procedures were fundamentally unfair because John’s hearing acted as
a “‘sham or pretense.’”132 For example, the panelists at John’s hearing
admitted their failure to read the investigative report prior to the
hearing; the investigator favored Jane’s credibility over John’s
123

Id. at 662-63.
See id. at 663.
125 Id. (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975)).
126 See id.
127 Id.
128 Id. (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 584).
129 See id. at 663-64.
130 Id. at 663.
131 Id. (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 580).
132 Id. (quoting Dietchweiler by Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, 629 (7th
Cir. 2016)).
124
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credibility while never having had occasion to evaluate Jane’s
credibility; and Purdue’s agents refused to consider exculpatory
evidence justifying clearing John of the allegations against him. 133
These procedures—or lack thereof—together with the
significant loss of liberty at stake, provided the court with plenty of
reason to permit John’s Fourteenth Amendment claim to proceed. 134
4.

John Doe’s Title IX Claim

John also claimed that Purdue violated Title IX by
discriminating against him in the sexual misconduct proceedings
because he is male. 135 Though the court recognized that other circuits
employ different tests to determine whether a school violates Title IX,
it decided that the question is quite obvious: “do the alleged facts, if
true, raise a plausible inference that the university discriminated
against John ‘on the basis of sex.’”136 The tests employed by other
circuits, according to the court, “simply describe ways in which a
plaintiff might show that sex was a motivating factor in a university’s
decision to discipline a student.”137 Therefore, John could establish a
Title IX violation via many avenues, including, but not necessarily
limited to, showing that he was innocent, that a severe penalty or
decision was imposed because he was male, that Purdue was
deliberately indifferent to the faulty proceedings that harmed John, or
that Purdue used archaic assumptions in imposing misconduct
procedures, in their finding of guilt, or in their choice of sanction. 138
In large part, John blamed the Dear Colleague Letter for
133

See id. at 663-64.
See generally id. After finding that John stated a valid Fourteenth
Amendment claim, and before it discussed John’s Title IX claim, the court discussed
the type of remedies properly available to John moving forward in the litigation. See
id. at 664-67. This discussion is not pertinent to this Comment’s analysis and is
therefore left out.
135 See id. at 667.
136 Id. at 667-68.
137 Id. at 667.
138 See id.
134
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Purdue’s mistreatment of him in his sexual misconduct proceedings. 139
The Seventh Circuit panel summarized John’s claim as follows:
According to John, this letter reveals that Purdue had a
financial motive for discriminating against males in
sexual assault investigations. To protect its federal
funds, John says, the university tilted the process
against men accused of sexual assault so that it could
elevate the number of punishments imposed. The
resulting track record of enforcement would permit
Purdue to signal its commitment to cracking down on
campus sexual assault, thereby fending off any
suggestion that it was not complying with the
Department of Education’s directive. And because the
Office of Civil Rights . . . had opened two
investigations into Purdue during 2016, the pressure on
the university to demonstrate compliance was far from
abstract. That pressure may have been particularly
acute for Sermersheim, who, as a Title IX coordinator,
bore some responsibility for Purdue’s compliance. 140
To determine Purdue’s liability under Title IX, the court first
discussed whether, and to what extent, John’s reliance on the Dear
Colleague Letter was justified. 141 Noting that “[o]ther circuits have
treated the Dear Colleague letter as relevant in evaluating the
plausibility of a Title IX claim,” the Seventh Circuit followed suit. 142
The court adopted the perspectives of the Second and Sixth Circuits,
both of which recognize the relevance of the Dear Colleague Letter’s
139

See id. at 668 (“John casts his Title IX claim against the backdrop of a 2011
‘Dear Colleague’ Letter from the U.S. Department of Education to colleges and
universities.”).
140 Id. (citation omitted).
141 See id. at 668-69.
142 See id. (citing Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 594 (6th Cir. 2018); Doe
v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018); Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 58
(2d Cir. 2016)).
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inherent pressures on schools to impose aggressive reforms.143
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit now recognizes that
“‘pressure from the government to combat vigorously sexual assault
on college campuses and the severe potential punishment—loss of all
federal funds—if [schools] fail[ ] to comply,’” together with other
factual allegations, supports “‘a reasonable inference of gender
discrimination.’”144 As the Sixth Circuit has stated, the pressure from a
government “investigation and the resulting negative publicity
‘provides a backdrop, that, when combined with other circumstantial
evidence of bias in Doe’s specific proceeding, gives rise to a plausible
claim.’”145 Put differently, the Seventh Circuit now holds that it is
sufficiently plausible to withstand a motion to dismiss to suggest an
“‘inference that the panel adopted a biased stance in favor of the
accusing female and against the defending male . . . to avoid further
fanning the criticisms that [the school] turned a blind eye to [sexual]
assaults.’”146
The extent to which the Dear Colleague Letter and its
corresponding financial incentive actually impacts the outcome of a
motion to dismiss, however, rests on the adequacy of additional factual
allegations in the complaint. 147 In other words, the Dear Colleague
Letter cannot establish a Title IX claim alone, but merely “gives John
a story about why Purdue might have been motivated to discriminate
against males accused of sexual assault.” 148 Following the court of
appeals cases that came before it, the court in Purdue University
ultimately recognized that, for John to state a claim of Title IX
discrimination, “he must allege facts raising the inference that Purdue
acted at least partly on the basis of sex in his particular case.” 149
143

See id. (citing Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 594; Baum, 903 F.3d at 586;
Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 58).
144 Id. at 668 (quoting Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 594).
145 Id. at 668-69 (quoting Baum, 903 F.3d at 586).
146 Id. at 669 (quoting Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 58).
147 See id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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The egregious facts concerning John’s disciplinary proceedings
made this case an easy one for the unanimous panel. Pairing Purdue’s
intolerably unfair prosecution of John with the reasons for doing so, as
easily inferred by the Dear Colleague Letter, Purdue University held
that “John’s allegations raise[d] a plausible inference that he was
denied an educational benefit on the basis of his sex.”150
The court concluded by explaining how the standard to survive
a motion to dismiss assists John’s arguments: “To be sure, John may
face problems of proof, and the factfinder might not buy the inferences
that he’s selling. But his claim should have made it past the pleading
stage, so we reverse the magistrate judge’s premature dismissal of
it.”151 In so stating, the court effectively told future panels that the
pressure placed on schools, coupled with schools’ implementation of
the Dear Colleague Letter’s requirements, as seen in the disciplinary
process enforced against male students, is enough to state a claim of
sex discrimination under Title IX. 152
C.

The Seventh Circuit Retreats: Doe v. Columbia College
Chicago

Purdue University brought the Seventh Circuit’s Title IX
jurisprudence full-circle and properly recognized the federal
government’s failures toward the accused. Less than two months later,
however, a panel of the Seventh Circuit retreated from the progress
made in recognizing the rights of the accused in Doe v. Columbia
College Chicago.153
In Columbia College Chicago, Jane Roe and John Doe II154

150

See id. at 669-70.
Id. at 670.
152 See id. at 668-70.
153 933 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2019).
154 In the lawsuit against Columbia College, the plaintiff is styled as “John
Doe.” This Comment, however, refers to Columbia College Chicago’s John Doe as
“John Doe II” to distinguish him from the John Doe in Purdue University.
151
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engaged in a sexual encounter in December 2015. 155 About two
months later, Roe filed a Title IX complaint with Columbia College
alleging that she did not consent to sexual activity with Doe II.156
Unlike in Purdue University, Columbia College here provided Doe II
with at least some process.157 Doe II was given a chance to present his
own evidence, and was specifically asked to provide exculpatory
evidence; the Title IX coordinator allowed the investigation to
continue after first deciding that “there was sufficient evidence for a
reasonable hearing panel to conclude that Doe [II] had violated the
school’s sexual misconduct policy”; and Doe II was given a chance to
review the investigation materials before the hearing. 158 Doe II was
also expressly permitted to bring his attorney with him to any
meetings with investigators; university administrators met with Doe II
to address his specific concerns about the proceedings; Columbia
College properly addressed Doe II’s complaints of retaliation by Roe’s
friends; investigators sent Doe II letters specifying the allegations
against him and repeatedly requesting evidence or witnesses on his
behalf; and Columbia College provided Doe II “with an academic
advisor who could approve any accommodations [he] might need. 159
Columbia College’s investigators also provided Doe II with the
evidence supplied by Roe during the investigation and permitted Doe
II to respond in writing to that evidence and ensured that every piece
of evidence presented by both Roe and Doe II was presented to the
panelists at Doe II’s hearing. 160
The hearing panel ultimately concluded that Doe II was
responsible for violating Columbia College’s sexual misconduct
policy, but not responsible for Roe’s other two claims of
misconduct.161 And when Doe II appealed this decision, Columbia
155

Id. at 852.
Id.
157 See id. at 852-54.
158 Id. at 852.
159 Id. at 853.
160 Id.
161 Id.
156
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College granted Doe II’s request to substitute the appeals officer
because the officer had been involved with a documentary that
appeared to favor sexual assault survivors over the rights of the
accused.162 The new appeals officer, about whom Doe II had no
objections, affirmed the hearing panel’s factual findings and sanction,
which recommended that Doe II be suspended for one academic
year.163
Doe II filed the underlying lawsuit against Columbia College
alleging Title IX violations, among other allegations.164 Just as in
Purdue University, Doe II alleged discrimination based on sex because
the Dear Colleague Letter, “pressure from the Office of Civil Right
investigations, and the aforementioned on-campus programming
combined to cause Columbia College to implement anti-male policies
to increase convictions of male students.”165 Although Doe II made
similar, if not identical, claims under Title IX as did John Doe in
Purdue University, his claims were not taken as seriously as they
deserved.166
Judge Bauer, writing for the unanimous panel in Columbia
College Chicago, significantly undermined the treatment given to the
Dear Colleague Letter in Purdue University—its mandatory precedent
decided less than two months earlier. 167 Judge Bauer’s linguistic
selections are telling:
To address [the problem of high percentages of sexual
assaults on college campuses], the [Dear Colleague
Letter] encouraged schools to publish their
discrimination policies, adopt and publish grievance
162

See id.
Id.
164 Id. at 853-54. Doe II did not claim Fourteenth Amendment violations,
unlike in Purdue University, perhaps because the procedures at issue in Columbia
College Chicago likely satisfied constitutional minimums.
165 Id. at 855.
166 See id.
167 See id.
163
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procedures, ensure their employees are trained to report
and effectively respond to incidents of harassment, and
appoint a Title IX coordinator. The letter also
encouraged schools to apply a preponderance of the
evidence standard when adjudicating sexual assault
cases.168
Contrast this language from that used in Purdue University less than
two months earlier:
[The Dear Colleague Letter] ushered in a more rigorous
approach to campus sexual misconduct allegations by,
among other things, defining “sexual harassment” more
broadly than in comparable contexts, mandating that
schools prioritize the investigation and resolution of
harassment claims, and requiring them to adopt a
lenient “more likely than not” burden of proof when
adjudicating claims against alleged perpetrators. The
Department of Education made clear that it took the
letter and its enforcement very seriously. And it
warned schools that “[t]his Administration is
committed to using all its tools to ensure that all
schools comply with [T]itle IX so campuses will be
safer for students across the country.” In other words, a
school’s federal funding was at risk if it could not show
that it was vigorously investigating and punishing
sexual misconduct.169
Columbia College Chicago rightly explains that the Dear
Colleague Letter, without more, is insufficient to permit Doe II to

168

Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 668 (7th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added)
(second and third alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
169
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withstand a motion to dismiss.170 But the court failed to address in its
opinion pertinent facts that demonstrate reasons to believe that the
Dear Colleague Letter was accompanied by Columbia College’s
discrimination specifically based on Doe II’s sex—facts that the
district court acknowledged:
•

•
•
•

•
•

A toxicology report found “that Roe falsely alleged
her self-induced alcohol consumption caused her to
fade ‘in and out of consciousness’ when interacting
with Doe”;
Affidavits from three students “indicated that Roe
did not manifest signs of incapacitation the night of
the incident”;
The hearing panel “concluded that Roe falsely
alleged that Doe held her down and forced her to
engage in non-consensual kissing”;
“A polygraph expert confirmed that Doe honestly
testified that he did not force Roe to perform oral
sex on him, Roe did not push his head away when
he performed oral sex on her, and Roe did not
appear to Doe to be under the influence of alcohol
or drugs”;
“Roe sent Doe a text message the morning after the
incident saying she had a ‘great time’ with Doe”;
and
“Roe admitted to the Hearing Panel that her
responses to Doe were ‘unclear or very passive’
despite previously claiming that she made repeated

170

See Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d at 855; see also Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d
at 669 (“[T]he letter, standing alone, is obviously not enough to get John over the
plausibility line.”); Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018) (clarifying that
the Dear Colleague Letter “alone is not enough to state a claim that the university
acted with bias in this particular case”).
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requests for the sexual interaction to stop.”171
Rather than delving into why the panel thought none of these facts
were sufficient, it ignored all but one and simply concluded—without
meaningful explanation—that it was plausible for the hearing board to
determine that Roe did not consent to sexual activity with Doe II.172
The court focused not on the ways in which the facts as pled were
insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, but instead on the ways in
which Columbia College defended against Doe II’s Title IX claim.173
But this does not answer the question posed by a Title IX
discrimination lawsuit, which asks instead whether it is plausible that
Columbia College Chicago imposed a process that was biased against
Doe II because he was a male student. 174 And it deviates from the
well-settled principles that the allegations in the pleadings are to be
accepted as true and judged on the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. 175
The panel also mischaracterized the requirement that
allegations involving the financial incentive and publicity concerns
addressed in the Dear Colleague Letter be coupled “with facts
particular to [the] case.”176 It therefore deviated from the precedent set
in Purdue University. The facts supporting the plaintiff in Purdue
University may have been more egregious than those in Columbia
College Chicago, but the decision whether to permit the plaintiffs to
proceed to discovery on their Title IX claims does not rest on identical
fact patterns. Rather, all that needs to be shown under Purdue
University is pressure inflicted by the Dear Colleague Letter coupled
171

Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chic., 299 F. Supp. 3d 939, 944, 954-55 (N.D. Ill.

2017).
172

See Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d at 856 (explaining how a toxicology
report that Doe II used to prove that Roe was not incapacitated, and therefore could
have consented, was inconclusive).
173 See id. (explaining the ways in which Doe II was provided procedures to his
benefit, not the sufficiency or insufficiency of Doe II’s allegations).
174 See Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 667-68.
175 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
176 Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d at 855.
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with facts tending to show bias against male students.177
D.

Other Circuits’ Case Law

With its decision in Purdue University, the Seventh Circuit
joined at least two other circuits that have held the federal government
indirectly accountable for its undue influence on schools in sexual
misconduct disciplinary policies and procedures. 178
The Sixth Circuit, for example, has become a leading circuit on
this issue. In Doe v. Miami University, the Sixth Circuit’s first of two
oft-cited opinions on this issue, a male student was suspended from
school for eight months, although the student’s successful appeal
caused his suspension to be reduced to four months.179 In addition to
some facts tending to show bias against the male student in the
disciplinary process,180 the court in Miami University again recognized
the importance of the external pressures placed on the university by
not only the public, but also the federal government.181 Explaining that
statistical evidence showed a pattern in favor of female accusers and
against accused male students in recent years, the court agreed that
such a pattern could have been caused by “external pressure from the
federal government and lawsuits brought by private parties.” 182
Agreeing with the plaintiff-student’s argument, the court clarified that
the Dear Colleague Letter could have played a large role in this pattern
of discrimination: “[P]ressure from the government to combat
vigorously sexual assault on college campuses and the severe potential
punishment—loss of all federal funds—if it failed to comply, led
Miami University to discriminate against men in its sexual-assault
177

Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 668-69.
See, e.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, (6th Cir. 2018); Doe v. Miami
Univ., 882 F.3d 579, (6th Cir. 2018); Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 58 n.11
(2d Cir. 2016).
179 882 F.3d 579, 584 (6th Cir. 2018).
180 See id. at 592-93.
181 See id. at 593-94.
182 See id.
178
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adjudication process.”183 On these facts, and notwithstanding whether
other plausible explanations existed for Miami University’s
adjudication of male students, the male student’s Title IX
discrimination claim survived dismissal. 184
In Doe v. Baum, the Sixth Circuit’s second well-known Title
IX case, a male student brought a Title IX lawsuit after the student
voluntarily withdrew from the University of Michigan in lieu of
expulsion.185 About two years before the student’s disciplinary
proceedings, the University of Michigan came under fire from the
federal government for its failures in responding to sexual misconduct
allegations.186 That investigation led to public outcry against the
University, which lasted at least through the plaintiff-student’s
disciplinary proceedings.187 As in Purdue University, the Sixth Circuit
recognized that the “public attention and the ongoing investigation put
pressure on the university to prove that it took complaints of sexual
misconduct seriously.”188 It also “stood to lose millions in federal aid
if the Department found it non-compliant with Title IX” and “knew
that a female student had triggered the federal investigation and that
the news media consistently highlighted the university’s poor response
to female complaints.”189
Also like in Purdue University and its progeny, Baum noted
there must be more than simply pressure on the university to be biased
against male students; there must also be some evidence that they
acted on that pressure.190 Evidence that raised a “plausible claim”
included the fact that the University favored statements from the
victim and her witnesses while discrediting the accused’s statement
183

See id. at 594 (citing Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58).
Id.
185 See Baum, 903 F.3d at 578, 580.
186 Id. at 586.
187 Id.
188 Id. (emphasis added); cf. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 668 (7th Cir.
2019).
189 Baum, 903 F.3d at 586.
190 See id.
184
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and statements from his witnesses.191 Baum concluded that at least
“one plausible explanation is that the Board discredited all males . . .
and credited all females . . . because of gender bias.” 192 All that was
needed to allow the male student’s claim to proceed was a
combination of “specific allegation[s] of adjudicator bias” and
“external pressure facing the university.”193
The Second Circuit took a similar approach. In Doe v.
Columbia University, the university suspended the male student for
one and one half years for violating its sexual misconduct policy.194
The male student sued under Title IX and the Second Circuit quickly
agreed that his lawsuit could proceed. 195 The court reasoned that the
hearing panel, dean, and Title IX investigator “were all motivated . . .
by pro-female, anti-male bias” in order “to refute criticisms circulating
in the student body and in the public press that Columbia was turning
a blind eye to female students’ charges of sexual assaults by male
students.”196 The university, in other words, was “motivated to favor
the accusing female over the accused male, so as to protect themselves
and the University from accusations that they had failed to protect
female students from sexual assault.” 197 The plaintiff-student alleged
specific facts that the University incorrectly weighed evidence to favor
the female complainant and changed its policies and procedures in the
wake of mounting public pressures from those that were originally
intended to protect the accused. 198 He also alleged, as in Purdue
University, that “the investigator and the [hearing] panel declined to
seek out potential witnesses Plaintiff had identified as sources of
information favorable to him.”199 The mixture of specific facts with
191

Id.
Id.
193 See id.
194 831 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 2016).
195 See id. at 56.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 57.
198 See id. at 56-57
199 See id. at 56; cf. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 669 (7th Cir. 2019).
192
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“substantial criticism” and mounting pressure for the university to
prove its compliance with Title IX gave plenty of plausible reasons to
maintain the male student’s Title IX claim. 200
Columbia University went even further toward recognizing the
true harms caused by financial implications of the federal
government’s determination that the school is noncompliant with Title
IX, albeit in a footnote:
[T]he possible motivations mentioned by the district
court as more plausible than sex discrimination,
including a fear of negative publicity or of Title IX
liability, are not necessarily . . . lawful motivations
distinct from sex bias. A defendant is not excused from
liability for discrimination because the discriminatory
motivation does not result from a discriminatory heart,
but rather from a desire to avoid practical
disadvantages that might result from unbiased action.
A covered university that adopts, even temporarily, a
policy of bias favoring one sex over the other in a
disciplinary dispute, doing so in order to avoid liability
or bad publicity, has practiced sex discrimination,
notwithstanding that the motive for the discrimination
did not come from ingrained or permanent bias against
that particular sex.201
With this, the Second Circuit confirmed the significance of the Dear
Colleague Letter and the corresponding financial duress placed on
hundreds, if not thousands, of colleges and universities.
Decisions holding the federal government responsible for years
of discrimination against male students is growing beyond these few
circuits.202 Because courts are now acknowledging the circular
200

See Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 57-58.
See id. at 58 n.11.
202 See, e.g., Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 204-05, 222-23 (D.
Mass. 2017) (providing the Dear Colleague as the backdrop for the college’s sexual
201
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consequences of taking Title IX enforcement too far, it will not be
surprising to see more courts, and perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court,
join the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.
III.

DOE v. PURDUE UNIVERSITY PROPERLY RECOGNIZES
THE SYSTEMATIC PROBLEMS WITH TITLE IX
ENFORCEMENT, BUT SHOULD HAVE GONE FURTHER.

Courts have clearly become more receptive to male students’
Title IX discrimination claims. 203 Yet, as Columbia College Chicago
shows, courts inconsistently apply the standards that permit the Dear
Colleague Letter and financial duress as sufficient to establish sex
discrimination under Title IX. 204 In Purdue University, however, the
Seventh Circuit had before it a perfect set of facts to hold the federal
government accountable for its role in discriminatorily punishing male
students.205 It could—and indeed should—have gone further.
The court first should have discussed how the facts pled by
John Doe plausibly established a systematic attempt to discriminate
misconduct disciplinary process against a male student, and denying a motion for
judgment on the pleadings in relevant part); Doe v. Lynn Univ., Inc., 235 F. Supp.
3d 1336, 1339-43 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (denying the university’s motion to dismiss a
male student’s Title IX claim relying on the Second Circuit’s decision in Columbia
University, reasoning that the federal government’s pressure, among other things,
supports a Title IX claim). But see Doe v. Univ. of Colo., Boulder, though Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Colo., 255 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1074-79 (D. Colo. 2017) (citing
cases dismissing male students’ Title IX claims and explaining the difference
between “pro-victim” bias versus “anti-male” bias).
203 See generally supra Part II.
204 See 933 F.3d 849, 855-56 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining how federal pressure
to favor female accusers was not enough because the plaintiff’s complaint lacked
“something more”).
205 When this Comment discusses holding the federal government accountable,
it necessarily refers to holding universities responsible for their role since they are
the defendants in these lawsuits. However, the Seventh Circuit could have written in
dicta how extensively the federal pressure on universities led to sex discrimination.
By permitting lawsuits to proceed on this theory, even without such obvious and
egregious facts as in Purdue University, the message to the federal government
would be clear.

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019

41

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 4

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 15

Fall 2019

against male students in sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings,
thus resulting in Purdue’s mistreatment of him. Second, it could have
addressed commentators’ concerns over the potential emptiness of
OCR’s threats in the Dear Colleague Letter given the lack of authority
to enforce its terms.206
A.

The Financial Incentives Provision of Title IX,
Together With the Dear Colleague Letter’s Terms, Is an
Inescapable Violation of Title IX as Applied to Sexual
Misconduct Disciplinary Proceedings.

An anonymous university student affairs administrator noted,
not long after OCR published the Dear Colleague Letter, the following
about the Letter’s impact on his or her job:
[M]y fear—yes, it’s fear—of seeing my institution’s
name in Inside Higher Ed or The Chronicle of Higher
Education as the subject of an investigation, or, even
worse, having the “letter of agreement” OCR makes
public displayed for all to read—makes me toe the line
in a way I sometimes have trouble justifying to
myself.207
The terms of the Dear Colleague Letter are, however, only the first red
flag; OCR’s efforts to enforce those terms are much more telling.208
206

This argument is perhaps weaker with respect to Doe v. Purdue University
and the other cases discussed supra Part II because the Department of Education’s
lack of authority to enforce the Dear Colleague Letter’s mandates was never
introduced in the plaintiff-students’ complaints. However, it is another avenue that
could support future plaintiffs’ complaints’ sufficiency to survive motions to dismiss
and is therefore worthy of discussion.
207
Anonymous, Essay, An Open Letter to OCR, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 28,
2011), http:// www.insidehighered.com/views/2011/10/28/essay-ocr-guidelinessexual-assault-hurt-colleges-and-students.
208 See Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, supra note 15, at 79-80 (explaining the
impact of the Dear Colleague Letter on Title IX enforcement efforts).
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About three years after OCR published the Dear Colleague Letter, “the
OCR announced investigations of fifty-five colleges and universities
for possible violations of Title IX in their handling of sexual violence
and harassment complaints.”209 A year and a half later, in September
2015, that number increased to 130. 210 And another six months saw
thirty-nine more schools added to the list of those being
investigated.211 In other words, the pressure to conform to the OCR’s
mandates was mounting quickly.
When the OCR concludes its investigations into universities’
Title IX compliance, it sets forth its findings “in long, detailed letters”
to the institutions in question. 212 In these letters, OCR explains
schools’ failure to respond promptly enough to sexual misconduct
allegations, failure to protect sexual assault complainants, and the
general failure to “‘address the issue of sexual harassment and
violence in the campus community,’” among other things.213 Through
these letters, the OCR tells schools that they must conform to the
OCR’s mandates in the manner recommended in the letters or else
they risk losing their federal funding. 214
As the American Association of University Professors put it,
“the OCR’s approach to compliance has become increasingly
punitive.”215 And “[t]he threatening nature of the OCR’s actions is
fueled by the ever-broadening scope of its investigations, both in terms
of the number of institutions under scrutiny and the breadth of the
OCR’s investigations at each institution.”216 Put more bluntly, the
OCR has managed to weaponize the financial incentives provision of
209

Id. at 80.
Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 80.
213 Id. at 80-81.
214 See id. (“The OCR’s recent or current investigations . . . have taken on an
adversarial character, leading to increasing fear that the OCR may wield its power to
initiate proceedings to withdraw federal funding.”
215 Id. at 81.
216 Id.
210
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Title IX to obtain total compliance.
The OCR’s actions have unquestionably extended beyond
those contemplated by Congress in the early 1970s. As a result of the
OCR’s attempts at cracking down on Title IX compliance, schools
“‘scrambl[ed] to ensure compliance with [OCR’s] guidance and avoid
becoming the subject of an OCR investigation.’” 217 With hundreds of
open investigations and blanket threats by the OCR about the potential
for losing federal funding, whether and how schools would be found
noncompliant with Title IX was a matter of great concern because it
“remained a mystery even to most college officials.” 218
In May 2016, a group of twenty-one professors from across the
United States concluded that they had had enough. 219 In a letter
published online, the professors protested that the OCR “unlawfully
expanded the nature and scope of institutions’ responsibility to address
sexual harassment.”220 They concluded that the OCR has “compel[ed]
institutions to choose between fundamental fairness for students and
their continued acceptance of federal funding.” 221
This is precisely the issue that is addressed in the case law
discussed supra Part II, albeit less critically. Yet the case law
considers the Dear Colleague Letter and the financial incentives aspect
of Title IX compliance only as a “backdrop” that must be coupled with
other specific reasons to believe that the school discriminated against
the male student based on his sex.222 It is entirely understandable why
courts tend to require more than just the pressure that the federal
217

Harnik, supra note 80, at 674 (quoting Ariel Sullivan, Illegal Procedure?
Title IX and Sexual Assault, NEW ENG. BD. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 16, 2015),
https://nebhe.org/journal/illegal-procedure-title-ix-and-sexual-assault/).
218 See id.
219 See Law Professors’ Open Letter Regarding Campus Free Speech and
Sexual Assault, at 1, 6-7 (May 16, 2016),
https://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Law-Professor-Open-Letter-May16-2016.pdf [hereinafter Open Letter].
220 Id. at 1.
221 Id.
222 See Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 669 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Doe v.
Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018)).
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government places on schools, for if that were enough to state a claim
of Title IX discrimination, then every male student in the country who
has been disciplined in sexual misconduct proceedings would be able
to sue their schools for Title IX discrimination.
The problem is instead that the courts, and particularly the
Seventh Circuit, have failed to recognize the systematic discrimination
against male students encouraged by the federal government since
2011. Purdue University came to the right conclusion, but left open
the door to the decision in Columbia College Chicago, where, against
the same backdrop involving federal pressure, the court simply
concluded that the particular facts did not sufficiently establish sex
discrimination.223 The court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that
restricting access to investigative documentation indicated sex
discrimination because they are “divorced from gender.”224
But that is the precise reason why courts apply the “backdrop”
of the Dear Colleague Letter. It ought to go without saying that
schools will not make decisions that obviously favor one gender over
another, as that would be obvious sex discrimination. The backdrop
offered by the Dear Colleague Letter and the financial duress it places
schools under taints sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings where
the schools apply the changes demanded by the OCR.
The clearest example of this taint is with respect to the burden
of proof requirement from the Dear Colleague Letter. The Letter
defines noncompliance with Title IX to include any school that uses a
burden of proof standard higher than “preponderance of the
evidence.”225 Without explaining why the burden of proof to establish
a public employer’s civil rights violation (preponderance of the
evidence) should be the same as the burden of proof to establish that a
student sexually harassed or assaulted another student, the OCR
simply concludes that standards of proof higher than a preponderance
of the evidence are always inconsistent with Title IX, even to prove

223

See Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2019).
See id.
225 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58, at 11.
224
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rape allegations.226
The Dear Colleague Letter goes further. It also specifically
requires that schools favor complaining victims over the students
accused of misconduct. 227 It requires that schools “afford[ ] a
complainant a prompt and equitable resolution.”228 It requires that
schools assure that they “will take steps to prevent recurrence of any
harassment and to correct its discriminatory effects on the
complainant.”229 It prohibits an accused’s access to due process
protections from “restrict[ing] or unnecessarily delay[ing] the Title IX
protections for the complainant.”230 It mandates that schools “take
steps to protect the complainant as necessary” and “minimize the
burden on the complainant.”231 It requires that schools “ensure that
complainants are aware of their Title IX rights and any available
resources, such as counseling, health, and mental health services.” 232
Ultimately, the Letter’s purpose is stated as follows:
When OCR finds that a school has not taken prompt
and effective steps to respond to sexual harassment or
violence, OCR will seek appropriate remedies for both
the complainant and the broader student population. . . .
When a recipient [covered school] does not come into
compliance voluntarily, OCR may initiate proceedings
to withdraw Federal funding by the Department or refer
the case to the U.S. Department of Justice for
litigation.233
Notably, all of these mandates, among others in the Letter, assume that
226

See id.
See id. at 8-9, 12, 15-16.
228 Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
229 Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
230 Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
231 Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
232 Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
233 Id. (emphasis added).
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accused students are guilty of the sexual misconduct allegations. They
compel schools to favor complainants throughout the process, even at
the cost of due process rights for the accused. 234
As noted earlier, the Seventh Circuit came to the right
conclusion in Purdue University. But it did not consider the systematic
discrimination mandated—either directly or indirectly—by the Dear
Colleague Letter. Given that there was evidence in the case that
Purdue was under investigation by the OCR for failing to meet the
standards set forth in the Dear Colleague Letter, 235 the court could—
and indeed should—have found enough specific facts to believe that
the systematic attempt at discriminating against males reached
Purdue’s campus. Evidence of discrimination in a specific proceeding,
as required in the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, should be
satisfied with evidence that the university put in place changes in
response to the Dear Colleague Letter.
The systematic attempt at discriminating against male students
becomes worse still when courts begin recognizing that the federal
government—tasked with representing the entirety of the country, not
just complainants—threatens schools with devastation if they do not
enforce policies that discriminate against a protected class.
B.

Having No Force of Law, the Dear Colleague Letter
Instilled Fear Under False Pretenses.
1.

The OCR Failed to Publish the Dear Colleague
Letter Under Appropriate Administrative
Processes.

To determine whether an agency action has the binding force
of law, courts look to three factors in totality: (1) how the agency
characterizes its action; (2) where the action was published; and (3)
“whether the action has binding effects on private parties or on the

234
235

See id. at 12.
Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 668 (7th Cir. 2019).
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agency.”236 The last factor, however, matters most. 237 The inquiry that
determines the Dear Colleague Letter’s legal weight most therefore
rests on whether it was merely advisory, as the Letter claimed, or
whether it was in effect a legislative rule.238
The Dear Colleague Letter expressly refers to itself as a
“significant guidance document” that announced the OCR’s policy
“about how [it] evaluate[d] whether covered entities [were] complying
with their legal obligations.”239 The OCR’s own conclusion that the
Letter is simply a statement of policy and nothing more does not save
its attempt at creating a rule with the binding force of law.240
Notably, legislative rules trigger the need for formal noticeand-comment procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act. 241
If an agency action “‘carries the force and effect of law,’” then the
agency “‘may not escape the notice and comment requirements . . . by
labeling a major substantive legal addition to a rule a mere
interpretation.’”242
Professor Lave concludes that the Dear Colleague Letter is
effectively a legislative rule that evaded notice-and-comment
procedures.243 She points out eleven instances in which the Letter
“tells schools that they must take certain steps in order to be in
compliance with Title IX.”244 The Letter therefore “‘imposes binding
obligations’ upon schools” by commanding, requiring, ordering, and

236

Molycorp, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 197 F.3d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
General Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 290 F.3d 377, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
238 Lave, supra note 72, at 943.
239 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58, at 1 n.1.
240 See General Elec. Co., 290 F.3d at 382 (explaining that, while courts
consider how the agency characterizes its own statement, it is neither the only factor
to consider nor the most important).
241 See id. at 944.
242 Id. (quoting Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 208 F.3d 1015, 1024 (D.C.
Cir. 2000)).
243 See id. at 945-47.
244 Id. at 945.
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dictating how schools are to act. 245 Because such language also
violates agency good practices guidelines, the circumstances militate
in favor of recognizing the Letter as having the binding force of law.
Professor Lave points out that the Dear Colleague Letter “is
procedurally invalid,” and thus “universities have no legal obligation
to adhere to it.”246 And yet, the Department of Education, and
specifically the OCR, have “made the consequences for not abiding by
[the Dear Colleague Letter] so significant that it is effectively legally
binding.”247
Calling this “an unprecedented move,” Professor Lave explains
how the OCR abused its executive authority by following through on
its threat to schools.248 It began publishing lists of universities under
investigation, which in turn “put tremendous financial and social
pressure on schools to comply with the Dear Colleague Letter. 249 It
therefore did not matter whether schools thought the Dear Colleague
Letter was valid because the ramifications of disregarding it were so
devastating.250
In sum, it is likely that no court would enforce the OCR’s
attempt at withdrawing federal funds from schools based on the Dear
Colleague Letter. And yet the risk that such funding would be taken
away outweighed any objections that schools had to the OCR’s
mandates. The OCR’s threats to financially ruin schools that did not
conform to its terms was therefore an empty one, but one that left
schools with no realistic choice.
2.

Compelling Sex Discrimination By Putting
Schools in Financial Duress Violates the
Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

245

Id. at 946 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 390 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)).
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 See id. at 947.
249 Id.
250 See id.
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The U.S. Constitution authorizes the federal government “to
offer federal grant funds to states and localities that are contingent on
the recipients engaging in, or refraining from, certain activities.” 251
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that “the language in our earlier
opinions stands for the unexceptionable proposition that the [spending]
power may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that
would themselves be unconstitutional.”252
The Court added that “in some circumstances the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the
point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”253 Where “states
have no real choice but to accept the funding and enact or administer a
federal program,” the federal government has violated the Spending
Clause.254 Therefore, for example, “a grant of federal funds
conditioned on invidiously discriminatory state action . . . would be an
illegitimate exercise of the Congress’ broad spending power.”255
The U.S. Supreme Court has invalidated federal funding in this
light only once.256 In National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius,257 the Court distinguished the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),
so-called “Obamacare,” from the facts in Dole where the federal law
simply encouraged the states to raise the drinking age to twentyone.258 The ACA, however, did more than “encourage” states to
conform their individual Medicaid programs with the federal Medicaid
law; the ACA’s financial inducement operated as “a gun to the
251

Brian T. Yeh, The Federal Government’s Authority to Impose Conditions
on Grant Funds, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT (Mar. 23, 2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44797.pdf.; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203, 206 (1987) (explaining that the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution
permits conditional spending).
252 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added).
253 Id. at 211.
254 Yeh, supra note 251, at 7 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 207, 211).
255 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210-11.
256 Yeh, supra note 251, at 11.
257 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
258 See id. at 580-81.
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head.”259 In fact, “[a] State that opt[ed] out of the [ACA]’s expansion
in health care coverage thus [stood] to lose not merely ‘a relatively
small percentage’ of its existing Medicaid funding, but all of it.”260
Just as the threat to withdraw all federal Medicaid funding
constituted a gun to the head of the States, and thus ran afoul of the
Spending Clause, so too does the OCR’s threats to pull funding for
noncompliance with Title IX. Here, however, the Department of
Education has unequivocally conditioned the grant of federal funds on
systematic discrimination against male students. It has, in other words,
“compel[ed] institutions to choose between fundamental fairness for
students and their continued acceptance of federal funding.” 261 As in
Sebelius, the Department of Education has effectively put a gun to the
head of every school and forced them to discriminate against male
students. This cannot be allowed to stand, and the Seventh Circuit
missed an opportunity, at least in dicta, to hold the federal government
accountable.
CONCLUSION
Sexual misconduct is, no doubt, worthy of punishment. It is
certainly a principled and worthwhile cause to ensure that schools
protect students from sexual violence to the best of their ability. But
there comes a time when courts must step in to make sure that those
righteous objectives are sought by righteous means. Because the
federal government has attempted to accomplish those objectives in a
manner that runs contrary to our sacred values of justice and fairness,
courts must enjoin such detrimental activity. The Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Purdue University makes positive strides toward protecting
the accused. As more students—both males and females—are hurt by
their beloved universities in Title IX proceedings, courts will continue
to have no choice but to hold all parties accountable.
President Trump’s Administration began the process of reform
259

Id. at 581.
Id.
261 Open Letter, supra note 219, at 6-7.
260
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by rescinding the Dear Colleague Letter. But the Letter’s effects
remain, and the fight will continue about how to best protect against
sexual violence while maintaining fair and equitable disciplinary
processes. Courts have a large role to play in this fight. Let’s hope
they continue to pay attention to all perspectives in that fight,
including the unpopular ones.
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